F ew public health interventions promise an easier payoff than getting people to wash their hands with soap. It's easy, and studies suggest it could prevent up to two-fifths of all diarrheal disease and one-fourth of pneumonia, the two biggest childhood killers in poor countries, saving up to 1 million lives every year. With hand-washing, there's none of the controversy surrounding condoms and birth control. Yet despite decades of effort and millions of dollars, only between 3% and 34% of people in poor countries regularly wash their hands. Simple routines, it turns out, are not always easy to instill.
In 2008, the Peruvian government, with support from the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, launched a media campaign called "clean hands, healthy children" to improve hygiene in 40 randomly selected districts across Peru. Radio spots, brochures, and posters, targeted at millions of mothers and children, stressed the importance of washing hands after going to the toilet or changing a baby and before cooking and eating. In 44 more districts, the media campaign was launched together with further interventions: Primary schools added hand-washing lessons, and teachers and local leaders educated mothers. More than 80,000 simple hand-washing stations designed by the company Duraplast and fashioned out of old plastic bottles-one filled with water and one with soap-were distributed to households. The campaign even introduced a cartoon superhero, Super Jaboncin, who fights germs using water and soap.
But the results were far from superpowered. A 2012 evaluation found that the media campaign alone did not change behavior at all. In communities with the more intensive interventions, hand-washing before food preparation increased from 10% to 17%. But researchers did not find a decrease in either diarrhea or pneumonia. (A campaign in Vietnam had similar results.) specific successes and disappointments in Vietnam, Zambia, South Africa, and Peru in this special news section are based on draft case studies in the upcoming book.)
A few prominent critics, meanwhile, say the new focus on evidence is going way too far. They worry that it diverts money and attention from the actual battle against disease. And rigorous attempts to measure impact can cause unease among major donors, the groups they fund to roll out programs, and disease advocates, says Ruth Levine, a development economist at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation in Menlo Park, California, who edited the first edition of Millions Saved. "The support for global health rests on a collective hope that money is turning into lives saved, and anything that punctures that belief is really very threatening," Levine says. The Global Fund and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which started in 2003 and was later headed by Dybul, together have spent more than $60 billion on HIV/AIDS, and both have received flak for not taking a close enough look at their own impact. For instance, they have long used the number of patients given antiretroviral drugs as a major yardstick of success. But people don't always take their pills, or they may drop out of treatment. So the precise public health impact, as well as the cost-effectiveness of specific programs, remained unclear.
Even if public health does improve after the rollout of a program, there may be no causal relationship. What's needed for a thorough evaluation, says epidemiologist Nancy Padian, who has appointments at both the Berkeley and San Francisco campuses of the University of California (UC), is a way to assess what would have happened if the intervention had not occurred. This is known in the lingo of impact evaluations as a counterfactual, and it's akin to a placebo control in a drug trial. "It's all about having the most robust counterfactual you can have," says Padian, who was a lead scientific adviser for PEPFAR.
A landmark demonstration of the value of this approach involved a social welfare program launched in Mexico in 1997, called PROGRESA, in which families received cash
